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Abstract 
The February 20th movement shows new modes of engagement with feminism, despite a 
striking absence of feminist organizations from the protest movement. Nevertheless, and in sharp 
contrast with most accounts that posit the irrelevance of feminism for Moroccan youth’s 
identifications and political subjectivities, I argue that feminism has not only penetrated the 
social imaginary of a new generation of activists, but has also informed their practices. What 
kind of tension does this appropriation of feminism by the youth of February 20th bring about 
with traditional feminist circles? Does this high visibility of women in February 20th indicate the 
rise of a new feminism? I will first briefly locate February 20th in a genealogy of feminist 
activism in Morocco showing places of friction, influence and tensions. Second, I will provide 
some indications of what I call a new feminism. Third, I will analyze the gender dynamics 
among the various components of February 20th, notably the secular and Islamist. I will conclude 
by sketching a new map of protests led by women and not necessarily intelligible under the old 
cartography of feminism 
 
Key Words: New feminism, Gender, Parity, Subjectivities, Activism, Arab Spring, Social 
Movements, Islamism.  
 
The Rise of a Movement 
The February 20th movement took many by surprise. During the Tunisian and Egyptian 
uprisings several virtual conversations were taking place about bringing the Arab Spring to 
Morocco. The fall of both regimes triggered demands for protests on February 20th, 2011, the 
date that became the name of the movement.  The calls first appeared on Youtube showing signs 
of new gender arrangements and cultural politics. This was not simply because of the alternation 
of colloquial Arabic (darija) and Tamazight (berber) languages. Rather, it was the young men 
and women’s alternating voices and faces that were indicative of new gender dynamics among 
the February 20th activists.    
The clip of the call started with Amina Boughalbi’s face and voice. Unknown to the 
public, Amina is a twenty-year-old journalism student and a founding member of February 20th.  
In a fashion similar to that of the Egyptian Asmae Mahfouz, Amina, speaking in the first person, 
initiated the call for protests stating: “I am Moroccan and I will march on February 20th because 
I want freedom and equality for all Moroccans.” She was followed by a young man who stated  
“I am Moroccan. I am marching on February 20th because I want all Moroccans to be equal.2” 
(Call for protest February, 2011). The faces of young men and women keep alternating, each one 
speaking in the first person stating her/his reason for marching. On February 20th, several 
thousand rallied in the streets in more than 60 cities and towns in Morocco. 
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This gender performance of parity shown in the call for protest is not only virtual, but also the 
bodily presence of women in the movement is visible at all levels of mobilization and 
organization. The women too take their share of police brutality, to which the recent kidnapping 
and trial of Maria Karim, a February 20th activist, bears witness (El-Ayoubi 2012). The women 
also speak on behalf of the movement in national and international forums. Amina Boughalbi’s 
intervention at the Centre Mosellan des droits de l’homme, in Paris in June 20113 and the first 
press conference organized by the movement on February 17, 2011 in Rabat serve as examples. 
The conference took place at the Moroccan Association of Human Rights (AMDH) in Rabat.  
The AMDH is headed by Khadija Riyadi, a long standing human rights and feminist activist. 
Riyadi opened the conference by introducing Tahani Madad, a 19 year old science student who 
spoke on behalf of February 20th. Tahani read the movement’s memorandum, introduced the 
various organizational committees and stressed the peaceful character of the protests. She 
stipulated that “no sectarian, political or religious slogans are authorized” and defined February 
20th as a “youth dynamic” that is “secular, modernist (hadathi), democratic and independent of 
all foreign agendas or political affiliations”. She concluded by sharing the desire to see the “flag 
of freedom, equality and social justice reign over Morocco, through peaceful means” (Press 
conference, 2011)4.  
Since February 20th 2011, the movement has been staging weekly protests throughout the 
country. The wide scope of demands encompasses political claims such as dissolving the 
Parliament, the government and the constitution, social demands including access to housing and 
free education, economic demands such as better wages and access to jobs, and cultural 
demands, notably the recognition of Tamazight as a national language. In a nutshell, the activists 
want to see truly representative institutions and a modern political regime in which the King 
reigns, but does not rule. This marks the first time that the accumulation of political and 
economic power by the King and his entourage has become subject to wide protests in the 
streets. The King’s religious and temporal authority, protected by articles 19 and 23 of the 
constitution, is viewed as the main obstacle to the rise of truly democratic institutions and 
political accountability.  
Since the rise of February 20th members of leftist political parties, labor unions and 
human rights organizations have constituted a National Council of Support (NCS) for the youth 
protest movement. The NCS is composed of a few high profile academics and journalists, most 
labor unions, 20 human rights organizations and three leftist parties, al-Talia, al-nahj a-dimocrati, 
and the Unified Socialist Party. International organizations, such as Amnesty International and 
the Islamists of Justice and Spirituality, al-Adl wa-l-Ihsane, also comprise the Council’s 
membership. The latter withdrew after the November 2011 legislative elections that gave the 
Islamists of Justice and Development, already represented in Parliament, the majority of seats.  
 
Composed of volunteers, the NCS provides logistical support and legal advice, and it takes part 
in the movements’ various activities and protests. Many women, including Khadija Riyadi 
Samira Kinani, Halima Morsli, Khadija Abnaou, are involved as legal counselors.   From outside 
of the movement, other women such as Khadija Merwazi, the founder of the NGO, The Mediator 
for Democracy, play active roles. Merwazi trains many young men and women in the practice of 
mediation, negotiation and advocacy. However, strikingly missing from these formal and 
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informal structures of support are Moroccan feminist organizations. A few organizations, 
including internationally renowned Association Democratique des Femmes du Maroc (ADFM), 
and the ligue democratique pour les droits des femmes, first supported the movement’s goals 
then withdrew after the King’s speech on March 9, 2011.  
How can we understand this territorial shift from the traditional spaces identified with 
feminism in Morocco?   Are we witnessing a shift from feminism as a discursive regime that 
opens channels for collaboration with the state, to feminism as a source of inspiration in a more 
radical project of political change? How can we understand the tensions between these two 
projects?    Can we speak of a new feminism? 
In the three main parts of this paper, I will first situate the current gender dynamics of 
February 20th in the genealogy of the feminist movement in order to identify places of friction, 
influence and tension. Second, I will provide some indications of what I called a new feminism 
before analyzing the gender dynamics among the various components of February 20th. I point to 
the indications of rising feminist subjectivities within February 20th and the tensions they brought 
to other players in and outside of the movement. This take on feminism goes in fact against 
previous studies which have either understated feminism for the political subjectivities of youth 
(Bourqia and all, 2000; Bennani-Chraibi, 1994; Bennani,  2008) or those claiming the irrelevance 
of feminism and the generational gap among feminist activists and young men and women in 
Morocco (Badaoui, 2010; Skalli 2011). Third, I will discuss the tensions amongst Moroccan 
feminist groups in relation to these groups’ positionality in a political regime dominated by the 
King and controlled by Islamist forces. I want to provide a lens through which we can see how 
feminism, as a discourse of gender equality, has penetrated the social imaginary of a new 
generation of activists not necessarily active in feminist organizations.    
 
Methods 
This paper is based on in-depth interviews with twenty-five activists from February 20th, 
half of which were women. I interviewed four members of the NCS and four women active in 
feminist organizations. I carried out participant observation in two meetings of the movement in 
Rabat and Casablanca. In addition, I made several visits to al-Wassit, the Mediator for 
Democracy, and had several conversations with the founder of this organization, Khadija 
Merwazi. Khadija has a strong background in feminist activism and human rights advocacy as a 
member of the Moroccan Organization of Human Rights. I also used several Internet sources 
including the Facebook page of February 20th, individual members’ blogs, on-line magazines and 
Youtube videos. Some of this material will be referenced here. My interviews were conducted 
with activists from the cities of Casablanca, Rabat and Fes. 
 
Feminism and its Discontents  
Moroccan feminism stands out as a leading case in North Africa and the Middle East (see 
Naciri, 2008; Jbabdi, 2008). For two decades the movement had launched a sustained 
mobilization to challenge women’s secondary status in family law, mudawwana (Salime, 2009).  
Feminism marked the turn of the century by forging one the most progressive codifications of 
women’s rights in the region.  The 2004 Code of the Family institutes gender equality, removes 
the marital guardian and obedience laws, provides women with the right to initiate divorce and 
gain custody of children, abolishes repudiation and restricts polygamy.  Additionally, in 2002, 
women won 10% of Parliamentary seats as an outcome of a long struggle to institute a quota 
system gained many ministerial, diplomatic and legal positions (Skalli, 2011; Sater, 2007). 
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Furthermore, the Nationality Code was reformed enabling Moroccan women to pass on their 
nationality to their children. As a result, many other codes have also come under scrutiny, 
notably the penal code after the 2012 suicide of Amina Filali, a 15-year-old woman who was 
raped and then married to her rapist.  
Feminist groups did not operate in a vacuum, however. Gaining momentum during the 
1990s, the Islamist movements were generated at the same time counter-feminist narratives and 
spaces for women’s voices were being made (Oum Yassir, 1992; Yassin, 2003; Lmrabet 2002). 
The appointment of women to the various ‘ulama (theologians)’s constituencies and state-
controlled mosques (Eddaouda & Pepiceli, 2010) serves as a case in point. Starting in 2000, 
these appointments marked the era of competing liberal and “Islamic” feminism (Moghadam, 
2003) in Morocco. They culminated in the mass rallies of March 2000, for and against the reform 
of family law (Salime, 2007).   
This brief introduction is helpful in situating the current youth dynamic in the genealogy 
of the feminist movement. Many thought that the adoption of the new Family Code would 
diminish the appeal of feminism among a generation unfamiliar with the struggle. While there 
are no systemic studies about this theoretical impact, a UNICEF-FNUAP study shows that only 
7% of the young people surveyed are connected to a feminist organization, despite a growing 
involvement of Moroccan youth in the third sector (El Azizi, 2005).  Rather than indicating a 
post-feminist era (McRobbie, 2004; Hall &Rodriguez, 2003), most studies have pointed to the 
irrelevance of feminism in the formation of youth subjectivities and political identifications.  
The few studies available on Moroccan “youth” have predicted a continuing impact of 
political Islam on youth subject formation and the importance of ‘traditional’ family values due 
to difficult ‘modernization’ and impossible economic integration (Bennani-Chraibi 1994, 
Bourqia and all, 2000; Cohen, 2005). Nevertheless, February 20th shows several shifts in youths’ 
identifications characteristic of what Bayat calls a “post-Islamist era” (Bayat 2007, 2011; Kepel, 
2000; Roy 1999). Rather than anti-Islamic, the post-Islamist era marks the shift from Islam as a 
political project to Islam as a site for individual identification.  One indication of this shift in the 
February 20th movement is the split with the leadership of the Islamist Party, Justice and 
Development, which opposed the movement, and their youth continuing to participate in the 
protests.   
The secular foundations of February 20th could have provided the opportunity for liberal 
feminism to “renew its base” (an expression used by several activists) and take roots in the lower 
classes targeted by the movement. The political hybridity and pluralism in February 20th could 
have been the place for generating a new feminist leadership and for making new breakthroughs 
in the state institutionalization of parity and equality, a desire shared by all of my respondents. 
Unfortunately, among February 20th activists, there is a real feeling of betrayal by the leadership 
of feminist organizations.  Shall we conclude that feminism, as a struggle to institute gender 
equality, has not informed February 20th. 
As we will see, the framing of this movement’s goals in terms of equality and the 
institutionalization of parity in the movement’s structures, indicate the emergence of a ‘new 
feminism’. This is a counter-topography (Katz, 2001) that disturbs first, the NGO-ization of 
feminist activism and demands, second, the confinement of this activism to women’s spaces, and 
third, its regulation by state institutions.  
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A New Feminism? 
Drawing quick generalizations about an emerging movement that most have predicted 
was born dead is very risky. Nevertheless, I found it refreshing to take into account the 
indications coming from my respondents as a way to provide a counter narrative to the gendered 
traumas of the “Arab Spring” (see Amar 2011, 2011b).  
Firstly, my respondents constantly challenged my desire to speak to female activists 
about gender issues. They kept directing me toward both men and women in the movement. 
They made me realize that I was still working within old feminist categories of exclusive female 
spaces and leadership. In February 20th, the leadership alternates between men and women. The 
issues of concern, including gender, are commonly shared and discussed.  
Secondly, to my surprise, this practice of parity is not necessarily based on a prior 
involvement of these activists with feminist groups. The new feminism seems to be emerging 
from outside of the traditional spaces of feminist organizations, and seems to be carried out by 
men and women as partners in the struggle for social and economic justice. The question of 
gender equality is too narrow to encompass the general goal of social justice that includes men 
and women. Souad (Interviewed in June 2012), an activist from Casablanca believes that 
“working together on issues of fair distribution of resources, accountability before the law, equal 
opportunities, dignity and freedom for all, will create an environment in which women are not 
isolated in their struggle for gender equality”.  It will enable a political culture in which women 
are perceived as equal partners” Khadija claimed (interviewed in June 2012). 
Thirdly, gender sensibilities are not expressed in the usual feminist rhetoric of “equality” 
before the law. More pragmatic, my respondents express it in a direct-action-mode in which 
parity is central. Carving out spaces for women’s representation in the movement is a case in 
point. Women participate at all levels of organization, mobilization and debate.  For instance, the 
National Council of Support (NCS) is composed of 160 members, representing various 
constituencies. Each one of these is represented by three members out of which one must be a 
woman. The other two members could be two men, two women, or one man and one woman. As 
it is clear from this institutionalization of the quota system, no constituency can be represented 
solely by men, since at least one member must be a woman.   At the same time there is nothing 
preventing these constituencies from being represented by two or three women since there is no 
limit on women’s representation. Not only could women form half of the members of the NCS, 
but they could also form its majority.  
Moroccan youth are finding new ways to engage with politics and feminism, which most 
studies have yet to consider.  I spent several days visiting al-Wassit, The Mediator for 
Democracy, created by Khadija Marwazi in 2007.  Merwazi wants to contribute to “the 
formation of a citizenry that holds state institutions accountable to their constituencies” 
(interviewed in December 2011). She seeks connecting politics to the everyday practice of 
“citizenship.” Therefore, several members of February 20th take part in her NGO, some for 
training, others for meeting and workshops.  During the legislative elections of November 2011, 
several members of February 20th received training as electoral observers. The members 
respected a quota system according to which more than 50% of the observers deployed in Rabat 
had to be women. Out of the 50 observers, 30 were women.  
Very significantly, this participation shows a deployment of a feminist understanding of 
political practice in terms of gender parity. This holds true for all of the movement’s structures. 
The men and the women work together, organize meetings, speak to passers by and distribute 
leaflets.  Most significant for gender representations are the street cleaning campaigns as a 
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performance of citizenship by women, and the “Freeze for Freedom”5 and “Freeze Against 
Globalization6” events, which normalize women’s appropriation of the public space as spectacle.   
The notion of ‘critical citizenship’ could help us understand February 20th’s mode of 
engagement with the state and citizenship. King Mohamed VI quickly responded to the first 
waves of protests by dictating a reform of the constitution in a televised address on March 9th, 
2011. He announced the formation of a Royal Council for the constitutional amendment and 
gave recommendations for the institution of equality and gender parity.  The new constitution 
would also allow broader prerogatives to the Prime Minister, hypothetically limiting the sphere 
of the King’s sovereignty. This address was met with enthusiasm by the political class and by 
leading feminist groups in Morocco. The main feminist organizations such as the Association 
Marocaine des Femmes du Maroc (ADFM), the ligue democratique des droits des femmes 
(LDDF), the Union de l’Action Feminine (UAF), the L’association Marocaine pour la defense 
des droits des femmes, endorsed the constitutional reform and took part in the debate 
surrounding the institutionalization of parity and gender equality in the new constitution7.  
Conversely, February 20th called for a boycott of the May 16 Referendum of “gifted” 
reform. Rather than disengagement from the political process, we are witnessing a new mode of 
engagement in which the boycott of the referendum does not exclude having a critical gaze on 
the electoral process. This critical citizenship has been developing through blogs, discussion 
forums, Facebook pages. It has enabled the constitution of a ‘youth gaze’ on politics that 
culminated in the rise of the February 20th movement.    
My intention is not to draw broad conclusions about gender arrangements in the entire 
movement, because of its leaderless base, flexible agendas and multiple centers. However, I still 
find it useful to take the information coming from my respondents as indications of emerging 
modes of regulating women’s access to “street politics” (Bayat 2007) and a liquidation of old 
feminist tensions between direct action and mediation through NGOs and state institutions.  My 
intention is not to engage in a conversation about the role of NGOs as governing bodies in the 
neo-liberal era (Kamat, 2004; Salime, 2010). I want, instead, to point to the displacement of a 
“feminist talk” from self-defined feminists to self-defined social justice activists, an argument I 
will illustrate more thoroughly in what follows. What we see is the desire accompanied with an 
endeavor, to couch all of the movement’s structures into notions of gender equality. This goes 
against the very gendered, disciplinary, and regulated arenas of feminist organizations.   
 
State Feminism  
February 20th activists consider the King’s address to be a turning point in the feminist 
movement’s decision to totally withdraw its initial, and very shy, support. Feminist groups 
applauded the reform and took an active part in the debates about instituting parity and gender 
equality in the new draft of the constitution. The implication of feminist leaders in a political 
process still dominated by the King created a gap between the leaders and those who were 
mobilizing on the ground. for a more radical change. Activists from February 20th see an obvious 
sign of elitism and co-optation by the state in the feminist position. To several of them, one 
cannot speak of women’s rights in the context of a constitution that puts religion and the King’s 
authority above international law. One active member in February 20th explained to me that the 
feminists have been “sitting in air- conditioned offices, writing reports to their foreign sponsors, 
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and making deals with those in power.” For these reasons, he believed, the feminists “can no 
longer walk in sneakers”.  
Another activist denounced the “feminists’ inability to see February 20th as an extension 
of the struggle for gender equality to issues of social justice”.  More accurately, many activists 
highlighted the feminists’ “old fears to see the Woman’s Question subsumed under broader 
demands of political change that may or may not occur”.  To these activists, the feminists’ 
emphasis on the specificity of “women’s issues” isolated their movement and channeled their 
efforts to state bureaucrats, foreign funds, and, not to mention, consultancy and expertise. There 
is a shared belief that gender equality could only be reached if “men and women are together in 
the struggle” and “are represented by institutions accountable to them”. Gender equality “should 
not be isolated from the general struggle for democracy and justice for all”.   
It is worth noting here, that there is a strong conviction among these activists that the 
state shifted to a more muscular approach only when the feminists withdrew their initial support. 
There is a sense of betrayal --expressed by most activists-- by a feminist movement that 
champions equality and yet cannot extend it to social justice. In my opinion, however, feminist 
groups’ relationship with February 20th and the state is much more complicated.  
As many studies have shown (Daoud 1993; al Ahnaf 1994), feminist groups built their 
activism around a legalistic framework that necessitated the involvement of state agents and the 
King, as “arbitrator”.  The reform of family law, for example, owes a great deal to the 
complicated negotiations among political parties, feminist groups, Islamist players, and King 
Mohamed VI.  Since the 1990s, feminist groups have positioned themselves within this power 
arrangement as ‘allies,’ rather than opponents, of the Moroccan state (Naciri, 2008). To endorse 
the goals of February 20th is to upset these alliances obtained through public advocacy, 
networking and lobbying.   
Despite feminist groups’ ambivalence about February 20th, I want to argue that feminism 
was the first movement to open multiple spaces for debating issues of democracy and citizenship 
rights as they pertain to women (Brand 1997).  The feminist magazine, Thamania Mars (March 
8), launched in 1984, serves as an excellent example (Thamania Mars Collectif, 1993). 
Thamania Mars articulated the United Nations’ regime of rights and a class-based understanding 
of gender equality. Restating the leftist sensibilities of its editorial board, Thamania Mars spoke 
of labor rights, unionization alongside domestic violence, political representation of class 
struggle, linking local demands to global conventions for women.   
Reflecting the aspirations of an emerging class of urban, educated and professional 
women, Thamania Mars advocated the spatial and social mobility of women and denounced its 
restriction by a codification that subjects women to male relatives’ supervision and permissions.  
For a decade, the magazine engaged in debates about gender equality and women’s rights, 
preparing the first generation of feminist activists who now form the backbone of feminist 
organizations in Morocco. It is also through Thamania Mars that the Union de l’Action Feminine 
(UAF) mobilized the public for the One Million Signature Campaign against the mudawwana in 
1992 (Freeman, 2004; Brand 2008; Sadiqi and Naji 2006).  The feminist movement was also the 
first force that took the issue of gender equality to the streets during the rallies of March 2000. It 
is clear that the issue of women’s rights did not stay in air-conditioned offices but extended to 
the media, the schooling system, the judiciary and, more recently, cyber space.  
The so much applauded new family code owes a great deal to the King’s prerogatives as 
Commander of the Faithful and mediator. These entitlements provide feminist groups with 
leverage to counter the power of the Islamists who could authoritatively speak in name of God 
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against painfully gained rights. This is why questioning the King’s authority is very risky for 
feminist groups, especially for the most urgent items on their agenda: full parity and the reform 
of the penal code.  
In contrast, February 20th members define their movement as a “dynamic of protest” 
(Souad, interviewed on December 17, 2011). The movement opposes “an economic regime in 
which the country’s resources have been concentrated in the hands of a few” and wants “to hold 
accountable a political class” (Amin interviewed on January 14, 2012) that benefited from 
privatization of previously owned state institutions, European cooperation and post-9-11 policies 
of securitization. Some feminist groups are certainly among those “beneficiaries” considering the 
changing positionality of feminist leaders from agents of dissent in the 1970s and early 1980s, to 
knowledge producers packaging expertise on gender for foreign donors and state institutions at 
the turn of the century.  
Having said this, it is no exaggeration to claim that Moroccan feminism has been a force 
of change of not only state laws, but also state institutions. Perhaps this is why young activists 
from February 20th were hoping to see this political force join. However, the feminists’ 
contentions with February 20th are not purely generational (Skalli 2011). There is certainly a 
difference between the liberal feminist understanding of change through state institutions and the 
February 20th’s desire to overthrow those same institutions.  
Equally important in feminist contentions with February 20th is the movement’s more 
inclusive approach to political partners.  The ability of February 20th to work with the Islamists 
of Justice and Spirituality posed a true challenge to feminist organizations.  Justice and 
Spirituality had previously championed mass protests against the 1997 governmental project to 
reform the sharia based family law (See Salime 2007). The feminists’ struggles with the 
Islamists are inscribed on an even longer path starting in 1992, when feminist groups organized 
their first mass petition campaign against family law.  More recently, it was the mass protest of 
March 2000 by Islamist groups that truly placed these two forces on opposite ends of the 
political spectrum. Interestingly for February 20th, it was certainly the Islamist participation that 
pushed the activists to re-consider gender and the question of parity in their weekly deliberations. 
Parity could no longer be taken for granted.   
 
Nothing should be taken for granted  
Justice and Spirituality was represented in the National Council of Support for February 
20th. This Islamist organization is, without doubt, the largest movement of opposition to the 
monarchy in Morocco (Tozi, 1999; Darif 1999; Salime, 2011).  Its decision to join February 20th 
was important since it would provide the movement with thousands of bodies in the street 
protests. These are the bodies of men and women who are regulated by a pyramidal structure of 
control, a Sufi tradition of self-discipline, a long practice of civil disobedience, and a Gramscian 
understanding of change as intervention in civil society (Darif 1999).  In fact, Nadia Yassin, one 
of the most outspoken women against both the monarchy and liberal feminism, is the daughter of 
the Supreme Guide of Justice and Spirituality. She was also the first woman to go on trial after 
her 2004 interview in which she declared that Morocco needs a republic (Bladi Net, 2005) 8. 
The February 20th founding members decided to discuss Justice and Spirituality’s 
admission into the NCS only after the first demonstrations.  The “secular” and “civil” identity of 
the movement needed to be preserved.   The Islamists could only join after the movement was 
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 The controversy can be found at this link: http://www.bladi.net/forum/45810-fille-cheikh-grand-satan/ 
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identified as February 20th, an independent youth movement that was “secular, modernist, 
democratic, and aiming to establish civil institutions and a civil state” as Fatima, an activist from 
Fes, stated. Only after that could the Islamists join.   
The integration of the Islamists into February 20th bears witness to the ability of this 
movement to embrace all components of the political field while still following the movement’s 
agenda and goals (see Piccinin 2011).  Amina Boughalbi and others claimed that the Islamist 
participation “enriched the movement by providing opportunities for discussions and networking 
among secular, leftists, Islamists and women.” As far as gender is concerned, the presence of the 
Islamists also led to the first debates about gender equality within the movement. Equality could 
no longer be taken for granted. It had to be renegotiated between them (who?) and their Islamist 
partners.   
Equal division of labor also had to be re-negotiated. Debates about gender equality, and 
its meaning and importance for the movement, became part of broader deliberations about the 
political and societal projects to which the movement aspired. Controversies raged over the 
slogan, “men and women have equal rights,” which was rejected by the Islamists. Compelled to 
keep equality within the slogan, the Islamists of Justice and Spirituality, subverted the slogan and 
chanted, “men and women are equal in the struggle.”  The Islamists’ subversion of equality 
compelled February 20th activists to adopt even a bolder understanding of equality extending 
them to the risky domain of “equal inheritance rights” (interview with Fouad, a member of the 
NCS).  
Interested to learn more about the effects of Islamist participation, I interviewed several 
women about their experiences. I spoke to a militant in the leftist party al-Talia who is also a 
feminist activist in the Ligue Democratique des Droits des Femmes (LDDF). She is active in a 
poor neighborhood in the city of Casablanca.  This militant outlined all of the “positive changes” 
she witnessed in the “attitude” of the Islamist members who were part of her neighborhood 
committee.  In this committee of 26 members, half  were women, and, in this activist’s words, 
the “Islamists got over their initial attitude toward working, meeting or listening to secular 
women”. She celebrates the fact that the Islamists’ perception of “secular leftist women has 
totally changed”. “We wanted to make sure they accept parity,” she said. “They had to partner 
with us. We walked and worked together and this slowly became no issue for them.”  
Beyond gender dynamics, a semiotic of colors was also at stake. It points to the ways in 
which religious affiliations and sexual identities were negotiated during the Islamist 
participation. The debates that raged over the slogans extended to the colors of the signs. Both 
the secular and Islamists components of February 20th decided to avoid colors that might point to 
religious, sexual or political affiliations and subjectivities, which explains the exclusive use of 
white and black in the signs.   
The Islamists’ withdrawal after the November 25th elections is perceived as liberation 
from this binary of black and white that does not reflect the diversity of the movement and the 
wide scope of rights, including sexual, for which some of its members stand. As one of my 
respondents stated, “We were stuck in logic of black and white, now we are colorful.” What is 
most fascinating about this process of decision-making is its consensual mode. This requires 
several hours of discussions among members to reach a consensus while at the same time 
enabling most members to freely express their opinion. Amina Boughalbi and others explained to 
me how these meetings became an “educational space”. Their male friends, in the struggle, have 
come to terms with interrupting women during meetings or speaking in authoritative voices to 
them. The women make sure that their opinion is heard, that they take turns with the men in 
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directing workshops, using megaphones, moderating the general assemblies and leading 
demonstrations. The educational spaces that emerged from February 20th seem to be structured 
around the young women’s new subjectivities as political actors and equal partners.  
 
Conclusion 
It is too early to draw conclusions about the work that these spaces will do to gender 
relations. I have no evidence to prove that the gender dynamics taking place in those spaces 
extend beyond them. My point is to show that there is something worth documenting. These 
spaces are not regulated by funds or membership or bureaucratic authorizations in the way 
feminist organizations are. Their radicalism stems from their openness, inclusiveness, pluralism, 
and diversity. Yet overstating the impact of this counter-geography of feminism will downplay 
the tremendous difficulties that February 20th has in taking roots among its poor and middle class 
constituencies, not to mention the intellectual class, which is totally dismissive of the movement.  
Meanwhile, feminist groups are suffering from major setbacks, notably after the 
November 25th elections that gave a majority of seats in the Parliament and the government to 
the Islamists of Justice and Development. In sharp contrast with the parity instituted by the new 
constitution, the women’s presence in the Parliament did not reach 30%. There are now 60 
women representatives and 345 men. Additionally, there was a sharp reduction of the women 
members of the government from seven to one. Bassima al-Haqqawi is the only female Minister.  
In the current government and heads the Ministry of Social Development, Family and Solidarity.  
She is one of the most visible, highly respected female members of Justice and Development, 
and had served for two terms in the Parliament. To most feminist activists, El Haqqaoui is 
another virulent anti-feminist voice in her party. Her appointment raises several questions about 
how she would lead a Ministry with a long tradition of liberal feminism (see Guessous 2011) and 
how she would handle the rising issues of abortion rights, early age marriages,  and  above all, 
Morocco’s reservations on the ratified CEDAW, the Convention on the Elimination of All Form 
of Discrimination Against Women 
Despite of all these challenges, I would like to argue that we are witnessing an 
unprecedented horizontal extension and a deepening of the question of social justice now 
espoused by various communities of women fighting for very specific needs.  To make myself 
clear, the fructification of the feminist quest for equality in the youth movement’s demand for 
social justice have led to the visibility of scattered and much more localized, movements of 
protests led by women in many poor urban neighborhoods and rural areas.  
We have no particular name for these uprisings here and there, but the name of the 
women who started them. For instance, when we mention the “women of Ben Semime”, we 
mean the protest movement that the women of this rural community have started against the 
privatization of a local source of water by a French company. When we speak about the “women 
of Bhalil” we are pointing to the protests staged by the women of this region  against their social 
and economic marginalization.  The “women of Ait Abdi” started their movement of protest to 
break their isolation and claim access to public transportation, roads and hospitals after seeing 
several women from their communities and surrounding neighborhoods giving birth on the 
roads. Youtube is crowded with pictures and voices from these systematic and spontaneous 
protests by women facing situations that push them to act together.  According to Khadija 
Abnaou, a feminist and human rights activist, February 20th has led to the emergence of a new 
generation of women’s leadership, while taking grassroots women, not the elites, to the streets. 
This is why Amina Bougahlbi considers February 20th as “an educational space.” According to 
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her, not only are the men and the women learning “how to work together, listen to one another 
and respect each other’s opinion,” but also the movement has helped young women to put the 
questions of equality and parity into practice in the movement.  
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